US Arms Transfer Policy and the F-X: Can Tigershark Survive

摘要

On 4 January 1980, the Carter Administration announced a revision of its policy on the development of fighter aircraft specifically for export. This exception opened the way formally for submission of industry proposals for development and production of a new intermediate export fighter which was to be designated the F-X. Until this point, Carter's arms transfer policy had explicitly prohibited development or significant modification of advanced weapons systems solely for export, however, late in his term he was to realize that the sale of the F-X would be in the national interest and, thus, compatible with US arms transfer policy. Carter guidelines for the new export fighter called for an aircraft having cost and performance characteristics which lie generally between the F-5E and F-16A fighters then in production. The aircraft was to be capable of defending recipients from projected air threats into the 1990s; have a secondary air-to-ground capability in close air support of ground forces but yet be sufficiently limited in offensive range-payload capability so as to be clearly out of the class of US advanced, fighter aircraft; and was to have lower cost and easier maintainability than current first-line US fighters. Unlike its predecessors in the export fighter arena, the F-X would receive no government funding for its development. Manufacturers were to assume all financial and marketing risks; however, the aircraft was to be sold on a strict government-to-government basis, in accordance with the provisions of the 1976 Arms Export Control Act. (11:17) The purpose of this paper is to examine the rationale for developing a new generation intermediate export fighter, assess the impact that contemporary US arms transfer policies have had on its development and sale, and attempt to define the degree of US government support required to make the F-X a viable contender in today's export fighter market.