International and Strategic Implications of a United States Unilateral Decision for Chemical Disarmament

摘要

Success with bilateral or multilateral arms control initivatives for chemical weapons has been elusive in the 60 years since the signing of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The primary reason for this generally revolves around verification provisions included in any treaty. The focus of the study was on the question would a decision for US unilateral action help, hinder, or have no effect on chemical weapons arms control negotiations. Data on the problem was collected using a literature search and interviews with key officials in the Departments of Defense and State (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency). The US reluctance to modernize its deterrent retaliatory stockpile, in face of an overwhelming Soviet advantage and propensity to use, was determined to be essentially equivalent to de facto unilateral disarmament. The fact that NATO has failed to integrate chemical warfare (CW) into its defensive policy and posture has created a condition which could lower the nuclear threshold in the event of hostilities. Erosion of the CW retaliatory deterrent has destabilized both the military balance and arms control prospects. The CW arms negotiating environment was characterized by problems of mistrust and psychological strategem. The greatest obstacle to progress was determined to be the verification issue. The study concluded that a US decision for unilateral CW disarmament would not improve the prospects for effective CW arms control. (Author)