Feasibility Study of Surveillance Avoidance during the Deployment of Soviet Payloads of Military Interest into Orbit from a Soviet Shuttle

摘要

The purpose of this thesis was to start a line of inquiry into how well the North American Aerospace Defense Command's (NORAD) radars can detect a satellite deployment from a Soviet space shuttle, one that is comparable to the U.S. space shuttle in size and capability. The radar locations and capabilities were assumed to be the ones presently operating plus a new PAVE PAWS radar in Texas and a new mechanical tracker on the island of Saipan. All radars were assumed to be in working order, and tracking the shuttle. The shuttle was assumed to be launched in a 51.62 deg inclination, and would attempt deployment only at an ascending or descending node. The satellite could move away from the shuttle along the shuttle's radius vector, velocity vector, or angular momentum vector, so that it is approximately 50 kilometers from the shuttle one half an orbital revolution later. The geocentric angular separation, absolute distance apart and range difference is calculated when the pair are closest to the radar. The elevation angle above the radar's horizon is estimated, and assuming the worst-case viewing geometry of the shuttle and satellite by the radar site, a topocentric range difference and angular separation are determined. These values of angle and distance are compared to that particular radar's capabilities and if the range and angle are much larger, approximately equal to, or less, than the sensor's limiting range and beamwidth, then the probability of detection is labeled high, medium or low, respectively. An orbital maneuver burn of a naval surveillance satellite at a selected deployment opportunity is tested, leading to its detection by the next radar that has an opportunity to view the shuttle and satellite.