Negotiation from Weakness: Achieving National Security Objectives from a Position of Strategic Inferiority

摘要

The phrase 'negotiating from weakness' has been used as an informal description of an adverse or undesirable relative position for a nation attempting to interact with other members of the international system. As such it has represented the antithesis of 'negotiating from strength', a condition considered essential by American foreign policy makers of the nineteen-fifties for successful negotiation with the Soviet Union. This study develops a distinct concept of negotiating from weakness in order to examine various approaches that can be used by 'strategically inferior' nations to achieve strategic objectives through negotiations. The primary impetus for this study is the erosion of the American strategic position relative to the Soviet Union. Five strategies and twelve corresponding tactics appropriate for negotiating from weakness are developed, supporting historical examples are assessed, and general conclusions on the applicability for American foreign policy are presented. Keywords: International negotiations; Strategic inferiority; Strategic superiority; Arms control; Diplomatic deception; Negotiation strategy.