Scylla and Charybdis: the Army's Development of War Plan Orange.

摘要

Planning for hypothetical wars represented one of the most daunting challenges for the Army in the interwar years (1919-1941). A challenging strategic environment, a weak force lacking in significant capability, and no unified national security apparatus all combined to limit the options available to the Army's War Plans Division. War Plan Orange, the plan to defeat Japan, emerged as the most likely contingency and received the greatest emphasis for development. Published in 1924, 1928, and 1938, War Plan Orange evolved in response to changes in the strategic environment and inherent constraints placed on the planners. This monograph examines how the planners of the Army War Plans Division developed their contribution to the overall conception of War Plan Orange. By placing the plans within the context in which they developed like the strategic environment, the condition of the army, and the deliberations surrounding its development, a comprehensive picture of the plan emerges. This picture allows for a reasoned evaluation of the feasibility of the plan. Rather than make comparisons with Japanese capabilities and the likelihood of success against the Japanese, this monograph solely examines the initial objectives sought by the plan, and if they were achievable given the condition of the Army. The War Plans Division produced plans of increasing feasibility during the interwar years. In the 1924 plan, through a combination of faulty assumptions and wishful thinking, the War Plans Division created an impractical plan in response to political pressure to immediately relieve the Philippines. The 1928 Plan, while marginally better, prescribed a rigid course of action the force commander would take to relieve the Philippines. Only the 1938 plan presented a plan that was within the capabilities of the Army, and allowed the force commander the flexibility to act according to his discretion.