Panama: Military Victory, Interagency Failure: A Case Study of PolicyImplementation

摘要

This monograph examines the question of interagency action at the operationallevel by analyzing the case of Panama from 1987 to 1990. It asks the question: Does the United States have the ability to integrate the actions of Federal Agencies at the operational, or campaign level. The basic criteria used for evaluation of effectiveness are objective focus, unity of effort, and responsiveness. The research considers the theories explaining why large organizations fad to achieve effective implementation. Three basic schools of thought are identified: the Rational Actor theory; the Organizational Theory; the Bureaucratic theory. The monograph shows the applicability of the case and makes the point that there are still problems in integrating agency operations. The case study identifies problems of integration during the three major periods of the Panama crisis. Specifically, the study finds evidence that actions were not successfully integrated because of problems which were explicable under the three theories. The research reaches the conclusion that the United States does not have an effective system for integrating interagency operations. Panama, Just cause, Woerner, Crowe, Interagency, Noriega, Shultz.