Inferring Motivesin Psychology andPsychoanalysis

摘要

Griinbaum argues that psychoanalysis cannot justify its inferences regarding motives using its own methodology, as only the employment of Mill's canons can justify causal inferences (which inferences to motives are). I consider an argument offered by Hopkins regarding the nature and status of our everyday inferences from other people's behavior to their motives that seeks to rebut Griinbaum's charge by defending a form of inference to the best explanation that makes use of connections in intentional content between behavior and motives. I argue that Hopkins succeeds in defeating Griinbaum's objection as it is presented, but that work in social psychology presents a further challenge. I discuss the extent to which the challenge can be met, and conclude that certain types of inference in psychoanalysis are justifiable, but others, including those which are the target of Griinbaum's objection, cannot be justified by the methods defended by Hopkins.