GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MACROECONOMIC SITUATION

摘要

1. More than usual, world economic prospects depend on events, notably policy decisions related to the euro-area debt crisis and US fiscal policy. The nature and timing of many such events remain highly uncertain and the projection presented in this Economic Outlook therefore portrays a "muddling-through" case in the absence of decisive events. 2. With this caveat, and against a profound loss of confidence related to the euro area debt crisis and US fiscal policy, the muddling-through projection involves very weak OECD growth in the near term, and a mild recession in the euro area, followed by a very gradual recovery. 3.Concomitantly, unemployment would remain at a high level through 2013 and inflation would be under downward pressure in most regions. 4. This calls for a continuation of present easy monetary policy stances for a considerable period and in some cases, most notably the euro area, a substantial relaxation of monetary conditions. 5. Underlying budget consolidation is assumed to take place in most OECD countries; in the United States it is assumed to be weaker than embodied in current legislation, so as not to unduly restrain growth, and broadly in line with official consolidation plans in the euro area. In Japan, post-earthquake reconstruction spending will temporarily push up the budget deficit. 6. With growth in emerging economies also having slowed and with high external surpluses in oil-exporting countries, global current account re-balancing has stalled. Imbalances are projected to remain broadly stable, but at a lower level than before the 2008-09 crisis, as demand growth recovers slightly more rapidly outside the OECD area than within. 7. Serious downside risks stem from the euro area, linked to further contagion in sovereign debt markets driven by the possibility of sovereign default and its associated cross-border effects on creditors and risks to the monetary union itself. Without preventive action, events could strengthen such pressures and plunge the euro area into a deep recession with large negative effects for the global economy. 8. To stem contagion, banks will have to be seen as adequately capitalised and convincing capacity, and commitment to use it, will be needed to ensure smooth financing at reasonable interest rates for otherwise solvent sovereigns. Such action to address financial imbalances will need to be accompanied by governance reform to limit moral hazard and by decisive policy reform to address the economic imbalances at the root of the present crisis. Forceful policy action could result in a significant boost to growth in the euro area and the global economy. 9. A serious downside risk is that no action will be agreed to counter strong, pre-programmed fiscal tightening in the United States. Much tighter fiscal policy than in the projection could tip the US economy into a recession that monetary policy can do little to prevent. 10. The OECD Strategic Response to an economic relapse identifies country-specific policy recommendations that could be implemented if the economy turned out much weaker than projected: fiscal support, backed by improved fiscal frameworks, where the state of public finances and confidence allows; monetary policy easing where possible; and structural policy reforms to strengthen growth, lower unemployment and bolster confidence.