The moral status of the embryo: an attempt at an analysis with the aid of David Hume's ethics.

摘要

This article applies the moral sentimentalism founded by David Hume to the moral status of the embryo. It will attempt to explain the paradoxical fact that in Germany abortion is common and socially accepted while preimplantation genetic diagnosis is banned with the aid of an approach based on moral sentimentalism. David Hume established the thesis that the human being is guided by the emotions and not by reason when making moral decisions. Scientific innovations often create a feeling of anxiety. Consequently, the initial moral judgment about it is negative. Due to this habit, the innovation is often accepted after a phase of indifference. This phenomenon has been observed in the case of heart transplantation, as well as for IVF. Consequently, the apparent contradiction in the varying degrees of the embryo's worthiness of protection in the womb and in the Petri dish is due to the simple fact that these are different stages of habituation. Therefore, the ethics of Hume cannot stipulate the embryo's moral status for once and for all; however, they can paradoxically raise the ongoing current debate to a more rational level through the insight that the underlying moral concepts are not based on reason alone.