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A General Scheme to Predict Partner Control Mechanisms in Pairwise Cooperative Interactions Between Unrelated Individuals

机译:预测无关个体之间成对合作互动中的伙伴控制机制的一般方案

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Recent years have seen an explosion in the diversity of partner control mechanisms hypothesised to stabilise cooperative behaviour among unrelated individuals. Game theory suggests numerous strategies, each with specific decision rules that allow cooperators to control a non-contributing partner. This diversity of hypothetical strategies seems likely to reflect diversity in the types of intraspecific cooperation and interspecific mutualism that exist in nature. It is therefore important to provide a framework that explains similarities and differences between the various hypothetical strategies and that predicts how key parameters that describe the natural history of natural systems favour different control mechanisms. We develop a novel unifying framework for pairwise interactions between unrelated individuals, in which we link specific control mechanisms to specific game structures. The latter are defined by unique combinations of the states of five parameters that describe investment, aspects of the payoff matrix, the number of interactions and partner choice. We find that specific control mechanisms potentially have utility in a limited number of game structures; conversely, each game structure may typically offer a few competing control mechanisms. Our framework offers theoreticians specific problems that await mathematical exploration, while at the same time offering empiricists guidelines for evaluating the game structure and corresponding control mechanisms in their systems.
机译:近年来,为了稳定无关个人之间的合作行为,伙伴控制机制的多样性激增。博弈论提出了许多策略,每种策略都有特定的决策规则,允许合作者控制无贡献的合作伙伴。假设策略的这种多样性似乎可能反映出自然界中存在的种内合作和种间互惠的类型的多样性。因此,重要的是要提供一个框架,以解释各种假设策略之间的相似性和差异,并预测描述自然系统自然历史的关键参数如何支持不同的控制机制。我们为不相关的个​​人之间的成对互动开发了一个新颖的统一框架,其中我们将特定的控制机制链接到特定的游戏结构。后者是由五个参数的状态的唯一组合定义的,这些参数描述了投资,回报矩阵的各个方面,互动次数和合作伙伴选择。我们发现,特定的控制机制可能在有限数量的游戏结构中具有实用性。相反,每个游戏结构通常可以提供一些竞争性的控制机制。我们的框架为理论家提供了等待数学探索的特定问题,同时为经验家提供了评估游戏结构和系统中相应控制机制的指导原则。

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