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Limitations and Challenges of Provincial Environmental Protection Bureaus in China's Environmental Data Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

机译:省环保局在中国环境数据监测,报告和核查中的局限性和挑战

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摘要

Although administered from the top-down, China's environmental governance is characterized by decentralization, a feature that has been cited as the cause of poor implementation of policies at the local levels. To address this implementation gap, the central government in China has instituted environmental targets in its evaluation system of local leaders. However, the system of performance evaluation based on statistics and indicators has revealed problems of data and information abnormalities, falsification, and collusion between local officials to hide or misrepresent data. Little academic attention has been paid to sub-national institutions in place for data collection, reporting, and verification in China. This paper seeks to understand how institutions collect and transfer environmental data in China's vertical governance structure, as well as the challenges faced primarily by provincial Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) to shed light on why discrepancies and gaps in environmental data might exist. Using data gathered from semi-structured interviews of environmental protection officials in nine provinces and two municipalities across China, this paper provides an analysis of environmental monitoring, reporting, and verification at primarily the provincial level. The consequences of a complex, decentralized environmental monitoring system in China has meant provincial environmental protection bureaus face a multitude of challenges, including a lack of institutional coordination, weak incentives for environmental performance evaluation, limited auton-omy for enforcement, and varied capacity and public demand for improved information.
机译:尽管从上至下进行管理,但中国的环境治理的特点是权力下放,这一特征被认为是地方一级政策执行不力的原因。为了解决这一实施方面的差距,中国中央政府在其地方领导人评估体系中制定了环境目标。但是,基于统计和指标的绩效评估系统发现了数据和信息异常,伪造以及地方官员之间为隐藏或歪曲数据而勾结的问题。对于在中国进行数据收集,报告和验证的地方机构,学术上的关注很少。本文旨在了解机构如何在中国的垂直治理结构中收集和传输环境数据,以及主要由省环境保护局(EPB)面临的挑战,以阐明为什么环境数据可能存在差异和差距。利用从中国九个省和两个城市的环境保护官员的半结构化访谈中收集的数据,本文主要对省一级的环境监测,报告和验证进行了分析。中国复杂,分散的环境监测系统的后果意味着省级环境保护局面临诸多挑战,包括缺乏机构协调,对环境绩效评估的激励薄弱,执法的自主性有限以及能力和公众的多样化需要改进信息。

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