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首页> 外文期刊>Econometrica >FEAR OF MISCOORDINATION AND THE ROBUSTNESS OF COOPERATION IN DYNAMIC GLOBAL GAMES WITH EXIT
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FEAR OF MISCOORDINATION AND THE ROBUSTNESS OF COOPERATION IN DYNAMIC GLOBAL GAMES WITH EXIT

机译:退出全球动态游戏对错位的恐惧和合作的牢固性

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摘要

This paper develops a framework to assess how fear of miscoordination affects the sustainability of cooperation. Building on theoretical insights from Carlsson and van Damme (1993), it explores the effect of small amounts of private information on a class of dynamic cooperation games with exit. Lack of common knowledge leads players to second guess each other's behavior and makes coordination difficult. This restricts the range of equilibria and highlights the role of miscoordination payoffs in determining whether cooperation is sustainable or not. The paper characterizes the range of perfect Bayesian equilibria as the players' information becomes arbitrarily precise. Unlike in one-shot two-by-two games, the global games information structure does not yield equilibrium uniqueness.
机译:本文建立了一个框架,以评估对不协调的恐惧如何影响合作的可持续性。基于卡尔森(Carlsson)和范丹姆(van Damme)(1993)的理论见解,它探索了少量私人信息对一类带有退出的动态合作博弈的影响。缺乏共同知识会导致玩家第二次猜测对方的行为,并使协调变得困难。这限制了平衡的范围,并突出了不协调收益在确定合作是否可持续方面的作用。随着球员信息的任意精确化,本文描述了完美的贝叶斯均衡范围。与一局两两游戏不同,全局游戏信息结构不会产生均衡的唯一性。

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