Corporate propping through related-party transactions-The effect of China's securities regulations

摘要

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to investigate the phenomenon in China of listed companies propping up their reported earnings through the use of abnormal related-party sales. It is hypothesised that two factors associated with securities regulation of listed companies in China will distort the market for ownership control and consequently impact on the practice of propping. The first factor is the firm's risk of being classified as a "special treatment" firm and potentially being delisted. The second factor is the proportion of non-tradable shares retained by a State-based controlling shareholder from a government allocation. Design/methodology/approach - The hypotheses are modelled and tested using secondary data from 2010 annual reports and a financial database for companies sampled from the top 100 on the Shanghai and Shenzen Stock Exchanges. Findings - Both hypotheses are supported. Abnormal sales (a proxy for propping) are found to be higher for firms whose ROE had fallen to a level that potentially put them under "special treatment" scrutiny, and also are higher for firms whose proportion of non-tradeable shares had declined. Originality/value-Prior studies on propping have focused on companies faced with moderate financial shock being propped up by controlling shareholders so as to preserve their future opportunities to tunnel funds away from minority shareholders. Not previously investigated are the potential side effects of securities regulations on controlling shareholders' incentive for propping, namely, the identification that propping relates to the level of ROE needed to avoid "special treatment" status and the proportion of non-tradable shares needed as a buffer in the market for corporate control.