The Problem Is in the Definition: g and Intelligence in I-O Psychology

摘要

Scherbaum, Goldstein, Yusco, Ryan, and Hanges (2012) have aptly noted many challenges facing industrial—organizational (I-O) psychology in the consideration of modern research on intelligence. Yet, the source of the problems they identified is present in the title and first line of their abstract. Namely, the implication that "intelligence" is the same thing as "g" or "general mental ability." As noted by the authors, g is typically considered to repre-sent the source of common variance among ability measures (Spearman, 1904). Intelli-gence, as defined by many modern theories (e.g., Ackerman, 1996; Carroll, 1993), is a broader construct that incorporates not only the common variance associated with g but also a consideration of less general abilities, such as speed of processing and memory, and knowledge. In our view, intelligence is scientifically and theoretically more inter-esting than g. In the following sections, we discuss specific considerations for 1-0 psychologists and highlight specific areas that might inspire future research. We begin by examining the lack of new research on intelligence in I-O psychology.