Incentive Mechanism for Encouraging Co-operation among Infrastructure Provider and Virtual Network Operators

摘要

Allocation of over-estimated virtual resources results in financial losses for both infrastructure provider (InP) and virtual network operators (VNOs). Therefore, re-estimation of leasing amount of virtual resources by the VNOs, with InP's feedback, is necessary to avoid such losses. In this paper, we investigate how limited resources can be better utilized for the mutual benefits of both InP and VNOs. We design an incentive mechanism (work in progress) based on contract theory to motivate the VNOs for re-estimation by interacting with InP, and offer VNOs resource pricing that maximizes InP's profit. We also present an algorithm for re-estimation with two resource adjustment policies. We numerically evaluate the proposed algorithm, and find that it converges quickly and ensures a comparable re-estimation for the VNOs with estimation history based adjustment policy.