Fair Value Exposure, Auditor Specialization, and Banks' Discretionary Use of the Loan Loss Provision

摘要

In this study, we examine whether banks' use of the loan loss provision (LLP) to manage earnings is associated with (a) the extent to which banks hold assets subject to fair value reporting and (b) the use of an industry specialist auditor. We find that banks with a greater proportion of assets subject to fair value reporting (i.e., higher fair value exposure) use less LLP-based earnings management but more transaction-based earnings management (i.e., earnings management achieved by timing the realization of gains/losses). We also find that banks engaging industry specialist auditors use less LLP-based earnings management. Our findings suggest that banks' use of the LLP to manage earnings is more limited when they have access to alternative earnings management tools and when they engage an auditor with more industry knowledge. Our results should be informative to regulators, members of the banking industry, and academics interested in the earnings management behavior of banks.