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Improving health systems performance in low- and middle-income countries: a system dynamics model of the pay-for-performance initiative in Afghanistan

机译:在低收入和中等收入国家的卫生系统表现提高:阿富汗绩效绩效倡议的系统动态模型

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System dynamics methods were used to explore effective implementation pathways for improving health systems performance through pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes. A causal loop diagram was developed to delineate primary causal relationships for service delivery within primary health facilities. A quantitative stock-and-flow model was developed next. The stock-and-flow model was then used to simulate the impact of various P4P implementation scenarios on quality and volume of services. Data from the Afghanistan national facility survey in 2012 was used to calibrate the model. The models show that P4P bonuses could increase health workers' motivation leading to higher levels of quality and volume of services. Gaming could reduce or even reverse this desired effect, leading to levels of quality and volume of services that are below baseline levels. Implementation issues, such as delays in the disbursement of P4P bonuses and low levels of P4P bonuses, also reduce the desired effect of P4P on quality and volume, but they do not cause the outputs to fall below baseline levels. Optimal effect of P4P on quality and volume of services is obtained when P4P bonuses are distributed per the health workers' contributions to the services that triggered the payments. Other distribution algorithms such as equal allocation or allocations proportionate to salaries resulted in quality and volume levels that were substantially lower, sometimes below baseline. The system dynamics models served to inform, with quantitative results, the theory of change underlying P4P intervention. Specific implementation strategies, such as prompt disbursement of adequate levels of performance bonus distributed per health workers' contribution to service, increase the likelihood of P4P success. Poorly designed P4P schemes, such as those without an optimal algorithm for distributing performance bonuses and adequate safeguards for gaming, can have a negative overall impact on health service delivery systems.
机译:系统动力学方法用于探索通过付费性能(P4P)方案来改善健康系统性能的有效实现途径。开发了一个因果环图,以描绘初级卫生设施内的服务交付的主要因果关系。接下来开发了定量的库存和流量模型。然后用于模拟各种P4P实现方案对服务质量和体积的影响。 2012年阿富汗国家设施调查的数据用于校准模型。该模型表明,P4P奖金可以提高卫生工作者的动力,导致更高水平的质量和服务量。游戏可以减少甚至逆转这种所需效果,导致低于基线水平的质量和服务量的水平。实施问题,例如P4P奖金的支付延迟和低水平的P4P奖金,也降低了P4P对质量和体积的预期效果,但它们不会导致产出降低基线水平。当P4P奖金分配对触发付款的服务的捐款时,获得P4P对服务质量和服务量的最佳效果。其他分配算法,例如同等分配或分配比例为薪水,导致质量和体积水平显着降低,有时低于基线。系统动力学模型用于通知,具有定量结果,潜在的P4P干预潜在的变化理论。具体实施策略,如迅速支付适量的绩效奖金水平,每次卫生工作者为服务贡献分配,增加了P4P成功的可能性。设计不良的P4P方案,例如那些没有用于分配性能奖金的最佳算法的那些,可以对卫生服务提供系统产生负面影响。

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