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The Study of the Two-Way Principal–Agent Model Based on Asymmetric Information

机译:基于不对称信息的双向主代理模型研究

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摘要

The mechanism of profit distribution is the key to strategic social cooperation’ s operation. However, the research on the mechanism of profit distribution based on the traditional principal–agent theory was confined that the principal–agent relation between the members of the social cooperation is one-way, which is difficult to describe the two-way principal–agent problem in the new economic environment. This paper established a model to describe the two-way principal–agent problem based on asymmetric Information, and two cases that the virtual principal and the two entity agents choose only two actions and choose continuum of actions are discussed. Then the method of Lagrange multipliers is proposed to solve the model. The numerical example is given to illustrate the application of our model, it shows that in order to guarantee fairness and to strategic the social cooperation’ s operation, the members of the social cooperation shall share the profit, risks and losses in accordance with their investment share.
机译:利润分配机制是战略社会合作业务的关键。但是,基于传统委托 - 代理理论的利润分布机制的研究受到了局限性,社会合作成员之间的委托人关系是单向的,这很难描述双向委托人新经济环境中的问题。本文建立了一种模型来描述基于非对称信息的双向主代理问题,以及虚拟主体和两个实体代理只选择两个动作的两个案例,并讨论了一个操作的连续性。然后提出了拉格朗日乘法器的方法来解决模型。给出了数值例子来说明我们模型的应用,它表明,为了保证公平和战略社会合作的运作,社会合作的成员应根据其投资分享利润,风险和损失分享。

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