Effects of land fragmentation on the governance of the commons: Theory and evidence from 284 villages and 17 provinces in China

摘要

The extant literature on the commons describes a large number of factors that could explain the drama of the commons or why some commons are managed well but others are not. However, little is known about the effects of land fragmentation on the governance of the commons. This question is important for developing countries, especially China where land holdings are highly fragmented with farmers having on average 4.127 plots of land. We employ ordered probit and step wise regression based on data from a survey of 3895 households from 284 villages in 17 provinces or regions in China. We find, consistent with theoretical expectation, that land fragmentation has a negative and significant effect on collective action and the governance of the commons. Farmers with more plots of land are more likely to free ride and less likely to contribute to collective action. Our findings have important implications for the governance of the commons specially in developing countries.