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RESEARCH ON OPTION GAME AND INVESTMENT DECISION OF CHARACTERISTIC TOWN UNDER GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY ENVIRONMENT

机译:政府补贴环境中的特色镇选项游戏与投资决策研究

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Using the option game theory, this paper studies and discusses the evolution balance of the social capital investment decision in the process of planning and construction of the characteristic town under the two-way angle of symmetry and asymmetry of operating cost. Taking the government subsidy as the starting point and taking the sunk cost as the basis, this paper makes an empirical test on the critical value and the investment barrier of the private capital involved in the small town project construction, and obtains the following conclusions: whether the preemptive pre-emptive investment is dependent on the critical value of the leader is greater than the sunk cost. The cost of enterprise management is high and low; when the critical value of the common investment of more than two enterprises is greater than the sunk cost, although the enterprise does not invest first, it will also take the investment strategy in the market. The healthy growth of the market and the government subsidy will gradually eliminate the barriers of the enterprises in the characteristic small town projects and reduce the investment of the enterprises.
机译:采用期权博弈论,本文研究,并探讨了在双向对称角度下的特征镇规划和建设过程中社会资本投资决策的演变平衡。以政府补贴为本的起点并以沉没的成本为基础,对小镇项目建设中涉及的私人资本的临界价值和投资屏障进行了实证测试,并获得了以下结论:是否先发制人的先发制人的投资取决于领导者的临界价值大于沉没成本。企业管理的成本高,低;当超过两家企业共同投资的临界价值大于沉没成本时,虽然企业不投资,但它也将在市场上投资策略。市场的健康增长和政府补贴将逐步消除企业在特色小镇项目中的障碍,减少企业的投资。

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