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RESEARCH ON OPTION GAME AND INVESTMENT DECISION OF CHARACTERISTIC TOWN UNDER GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY ENVIRONMENT

机译:政府补贴环境下特色城镇的期权博弈与投资决策研究

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Using the option game theory, this paper studies and discusses the evolution balance of the social capital investment decision in the process of planning and construction of the characteristic town under the two-way angle of symmetry and asymmetry of operating cost. Taking the government subsidy as the starting point and taking the sunk cost as the basis, this paper makes an empirical test on the critical value and the investment barrier of the private capital involved in the small town project construction, and obtains the following conclusions: whether the preemptive pre-emptive investment is dependent on the critical value of the leader is greater than the sunk cost. The cost of enterprise management is high and low; when the critical value of the common investment of more than two enterprises is greater than the sunk cost, although the enterprise does not invest first, it will also take the investment strategy in the market. The healthy growth of the market and the government subsidy will gradually eliminate the barriers of the enterprises in the characteristic small town projects and reduce the investment of the enterprises.
机译:本文运用期权博弈理论,研究和探讨了经营成本双向对称和非对称性下特色城镇规划建设过程中社会资本投资决策的演化平衡。本文以政府补贴为起点,以沉没成本为基础,对参与小城镇项目建设的民间资本的临界值和投资壁垒进行了实证检验,得出以下结论:先发制人的先发制人投资取决于领导者的临界值是否大于沉没成本。企业管理成本高低;当两个以上企业的共同投资的临界值大于沉没成本时,尽管企业没有先投资,但也会采取市场投资策略。市场的健康增长和政府补贴将逐步消除企业在特色小城镇项目中的壁垒,减少企业投资。

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