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A joint maximization incentive in closed-loop supply chains with competing retailers: The case of spent-battery recycling

机译:闭环供应链中的联合最大化激励,竞争零售商:花电池回收的情况

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In the battery sector, retailers can offer a joint maximization incentive to manufacturers to push up green activity program efforts and use the return rate as a marketing lever. Our results show that a joint maximization incentive always increases the manufacturers' investments in green efforts and profits. Nevertheless, it benefits retailers only in a few cases. Also, a joint maximization incentive allows a decentralized closed-loop supply chain to achieve the same level of social and environmental performance as a centralized one. Overall, a joint maximization incentive always allows the closed-loop supply chain to achieve the triple bottom line when retailers are economically better-off through its implementation. In the presence of competing retailers, a joint maximization incentive turns out to be more effective as it increases the chances to achieve the triple bottom line. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:在电池行业中,零售商可以为制造商提供联合最大化激励,以推动绿色活动计划努力,并使用作为营销杠杆的回归率。 我们的研究结果表明,联合最大化激励始终会增加制造商对绿色努力和利润的投资。 尽管如此,它只会在少数情况下享受零售商。 此外,联合最大化激励允许分散的闭环供应链实现与集中式相同的社会和环境性能水平。 总的来说,联合最大化激励始终允许闭环供应链通过其实现通过其实现经济较好时实现三层底线。 在竞争零售商的存在下,联合最大化激励措施变得更加有效,因为它增加了实现三层底线的机会。 (c)2018年elestvier b.v.保留所有权利。

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