Mixed stabilities for analyzing opponents' heterogeneous behavior within the graph model for conflict resolution

摘要

Mixed stabilities are incorporated into the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) for modeling and analyzing a complicated conflict with heterogeneous opponents, consisting of both credible and noncredible players. To identify the mixed coalitional movements, mixed unilateral improvements (Wits) are constructed in this research followed by a specific example. Subsequently, two types of mixed stabilities are developed within the GMCR paradigm for conveniently portraying different sanctioning behavior of heterogeneous opponents. Compared to general metarationality (GMR), symmetric metarationality (SMR) and sequential stability (SEQ), mixed stabilities take into account different sanctioning moves by opponents, which is more practical and useful for investigating real-world disputes. Furthermore, the interrelationships among mixed stabilities and four classical stabilities are discussed. Subsequently, equilibria with mixed stabilities are proposed, in which each decision maker may adopt a different solution concept defining his or her behavior. To enhance the efficiency of mixed stability calculations, the algebraic representations of mixed stabilities are then constructed. Finally, a generic environmental conflict in China is utilized to demonstrate how mixed stabilities can be employed to effectively address an actual dispute with heterogeneous opponents. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.