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Pricing and sales-effort investment under bi-criteria in a supply chain of virtual products involving risk

机译:在涉及风险的虚拟产品供应链中,基于双标准的定价和销售努力投资

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This work develops a stochastic model of a two-echelon supply chain of virtual products in which the decision makers-a manufacturer and a retailer-may be risk-sensitive. Virtual products allow the retailer to avoid holding costs and ensure timely fulfillment of demand with no risk of shortage. We expand on the work of Chernonog and Avinadav (2014), who investigated the pricing of virtual products under uncertain and price-dependent demand, by including sales-effort as a decision variable that affects demand. Whereas in the previous work equilibrium was obtained exactly as in a deterministic case for any utility function, herein it is not. Consequently, we focus on the strategies of both the manufacturer and the retailer under different profit criteria, including the use of bi-criteria. By formulating the problem as a Stackelberg game, we show that the problem can be analytically solved by assuming certain common structures of the demand function and of the preferences of both the manufacturer and the retailer with regard to risk. We extend the solution to the case of imperfect information regarding the preferences and offer guidelines for the formation of efficient sets of decisions under hi-criteria. Finally, we provide numerical results. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. and Association of European Operational Research Societies (EURO) within the International Federation of Operational Research Societies (IFORS). All rights reserved.
机译:这项工作建立了一个两级虚拟产品供应链的随机模型,其中决策者(制造商和零售商)可能对风险敏感。虚拟产品使零售商能够避免持有成本,并确保及时满足需求,而不会出现短缺风险。我们扩展了Chernonog和Avinadav(2014)的工作,他们通过将销售努力作为影响需求的决策变量,研究了不确定和价格依赖需求下的虚拟产品定价。而在先前的功平衡中,对于任何效用函数而言,其确定性均与确定性情况完全相同,但此处并非如此。因此,我们专注于制造商和零售商在不同利润标准(包括使用双标准)下的策略。通过将问题表述为Stackelberg博弈,我们表明可以通过假设需求函数的某些常见结构以及制造商和零售商在风险方面的偏好来分析解决问题。我们将解决方案扩展到涉及偏好的信息不完善的情况,并为根据高标准制定有效的决策集提供指导。最后,我们提供数值结果。 (C)2015年Elsevier B.V.和国际运营研究学会联合会(IFORS)中的欧洲运营研究学会协会(EURO)。版权所有。

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