A teleological and behavioral view is presented of the concept of free will. Free will is not something people essentially have or do not have. Instead, the following question is asked: Why does society find it useful to label some actions free and some actions not free? It is argued that the function of such labels is to aid in assigning responsibility to people for their actions. Responsibility in turn is useful in assigning rewards and punishments. The sort of actions that are typically seen as free are the same as those seen as self-controlled. Such actions are responsive to environmental contingencies of relatively wide temporal extent. Copyright (c) 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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机译：提出了自由意志概念的目的论和行为观。自由意志不是人们本质上拥有或不拥有的东西。取而代之的是，提出了以下问题：为什么社会认为将某些行为标为自由，而将某些行为标为非自由有用？有人认为，这种标签的作用是帮助人们为自己的行为承担责任。反过来，责任对于分配奖惩也很有用。通常被视为自由的动作与被视为自控的动作相同。这样的动作对相对广泛的时间范围内的环境突发事件做出响应。版权所有（c）2007 John Wiley＆Sons，Ltd.
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