Critical Behavior of Spatial Evolutionary Game with Altruistic to Spiteful Preferences on Two-Dimensional Lattices

摘要

Self-questioning mechanism which is similar to single spin-flip of Ising model in statistical physics is introduced into spatial evolutionary game model. We propose a game model with altruistic to spiteful preferences via weighted sums of own and opponent's payoffs. This game model can be transformed into Ising model with an external field. Both interaction between spins and the external field are determined by the elements of payoff matrix and the preference parameter. In the case of perfect rationality at zero social temperature, this game model has three different phases which are entirely cooperative phase, entirely non-cooperative phase and mixed phase. In the investigations of the game model with Monte Carlo simulation, two paths of payoff and preference parameters are taken. In one path, the system undergoes a discontinuous transition from cooperative phase to non-cooperative phase with the change of preference parameter. In another path, two continuous transitions appear one after another when system changes from cooperative phase to non-cooperative phase with the prefenrence parameter. The critical exponents v, beta, and gamma of two continuous phase transitions are estimated by the finite-size scaling analysis. Both continuous phase transitions have the same critical exponents and they belong to the same universality class as the two-dimensional Ising model.