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Cheating at the End to Avoid Regret

机译:最终作弊以避免遗憾

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How do people behave when they face a finite series of opportunities to cheat with little or no risk of detection? In 4 experiments and a small meta-analysis, we analyzed over 25,000 cheating opportunities faced by over 2,500 people. The results suggested that the odds of cheating are almost 3 times higher at the end of a series than earlier. Participants could cheat in 1 of 2 ways: They could lie about the outcome of a private coin flip to get a payoff that they would otherwise not receive (Studies 1-3) or they could overbill for their work (Study 4). We manipulated the number of cheating opportunities they expected but held the actual number of opportunities constant. The data showed that the likelihood of cheating and the extent of dishonesty were both greater when people believed that they were facing a last choice. Mediation analyses suggested that anticipatory regret about passing up a chance to enrich oneself drove this cheat-at-the-end effect. We found no support for alternative explanations based on the possibility that multiple cheating opportunities depleted people's self-control, eroded their moral standards, or made them feel that they had earned the right to cheat. The data also suggested that the cheat-at-the-end effect may be limited to relatively short series of cheating opportunities (i.e., n < 20). Our discussion addresses the psychological and behavioral dynamics of repeated ethical choices.
机译:人们面临一系列有限的作弊机会而很少或没有被发现的风险时,他们的行为举止如何?在4个实验和一个小的荟萃分析中,我们分析了2500多人面临的25,000多个作弊机会。结果表明,在系列赛结束时作弊的几率几乎是以前的3倍。参与者可能以2种方式中的一种作弊:他们可能会因为一次私人硬币翻转的结果而撒谎,以获取本来不会得到的回报(研究1-3),或者他们可能会为自己的工作夸大其本(研究4)。我们操纵了他们期望的作弊机会的数量,但保持了实际的机会数量不变。数据表明,当人们认为自己面临最后选择时,作弊的可能性和不诚实的程度都更大。调解分析表明,对放弃丰富自己的机会的预期遗憾驱使了这种作弊行为。我们发现,基于多种作弊机会耗尽人们的自制力,削弱他们的道德标准或使他们感到自己已获得作弊权的可能性,我们无法支持其他解释。数据还表明,作弊行为可能仅限于相对较短的一系列作弊机会(即n <20)。我们的讨论涉及重复的道德选择的心理和行为动态。

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