Crimes against humanity in the jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda

摘要

A great achievement, wrote Lord Wright regarding the Nuremberg Tribunal, does not lose its value merely because it is transient; nor is a court of law like the Nuremberg Tribunal less a court because it ceases to function after completing the work for which it was established. The Tribunal's value to the world, Wright continued, does not depend on "living like a tree a thousand years"; it is enough that the Tribunal has taken its place in history and been recorded. The creation and development of the offense of crimes against humanity initiated at Nuremberg has been an important piece of the humanitarian historical puzzle, marking the end of the all-powerful state, critically re-framing the relationship between the state and its citizens, and furthering the recognition of individuals' nascent role in international law. For all of these fundamental accomplishments, and because of the charged historical atmosphere of the courts in Nuremberg and later in Jerusalem, the concept of "crimes against humanity" has for a long time borne a significance beyond that of a mere legal concept.