Reconsidering a Science of Psychology Built on Laws

摘要

The argument presented here is that a nomothetic psychology is both desirable and possible. It is prompted by the observation that although our theories and research are scientific, we have failed to create the coherent science that a nomothetic system could provide. A coherent science, a nomothetic system, would broaden our understanding by enabling us to explain (account for) constituent laws in terms of their relationships to higher-level, collateral, and subsidiary laws. It would be useful because the laws at each level could be traced downward through the structure to empirical evidence; lateral connections within the structure could be the source of hypotheses for further research. In addition, a nomothetic structure would provide an orderliness and integration for psychology, making it more easily comprehended, by student and professional alike. Moreover, the conflicts and incongruities discovered during the effort to construct a nomothetic structure would invite deeper, more precise thought and insightful empirical research to correct them, thus refining the structure and pushing psychology further toward scientific maturity. Construction of a nomothetic structure begins as largely an intellectual exercise. By critically examining the multitude of sources available to us, including our personal experience, and identifying the underlying commonalities, we can begin to formulate abstract behavioral laws. Some of these laws will be banal; everyday life is banal. Some will be interesting but not startlingly so. Some, however, will be quite unexpected, if only because, unstated and unrecognized, they may already be part of how we think about behavior. Together, the banal, the merely interesting, and the surprising constitute the beginning of the science we seek-sketchy at first, perhaps, but becoming clearer as we become more skilled in thinking nomothetically. The long-term goal is a hierarchical structure, the edges of which mesh with the laws of biology and other kindred disciplines, and, within the structure, abstract higher-level laws subsume more concrete lower-level laws. The laws at each level will derive their legitimacy from their genealogical ties to other laws in the hierarchy. Each law will have its appended theories and supporting data; empiricism is the ultimate arbiter of theories and, by inference, of laws. But because laws are descriptions abstracted from observation, they often are not amenable to direct test. Thus, the Law of Self-Interest is less amenable to test than either the Law of Effect or the Law of Maximization, both of which are less amenable to test than their respective explanatory theories. On the other hand, absence of empirical support for the theories does not necessarily invalidate the law they are designed to explain; it simply makes their acceptance more tentative; if another theory can be successfully substituted for the one that has been rejected, the law may be preserved. When substitution does not, or cannot, happen, the law ultimately must be rejected and, if possible, replaced by another law that can survive empirical scrutiny of its theories. If no acceptable lower-level laws can be found, the acceptability of the higher-level laws that subsume it is brought into question. On the other hand, if a theory is empirically supported, the validity of the law that it addresses, though not proven, is made more plausible, and work can begin on yet lower-level laws. For example, the Law of Self-Interest and its subsumed Law of Value Compatibility might yield an even lower-order law to the effect that people are able to identify more easily and more quickly that which they dislike than that which they like. But that is a discussion for another day.