Conceptions of reality and the experience of pain Comment on 'Facing the experience of pain: A neuropsychological perspective' by Fabbro and Crescentini

摘要

A core of neurobiological mechanisms is implicated in different forms of pain. Fabbro and Crescentini [4] show that this fact is significant both on the scientific level and on the philosophical level. Their main philosophical claim is that the existence of a neural circuit devoted to the experience of time suggests that time might not be real. An upshot would be that the objects which populate the world of our experience might not be real either, and hence the attachment to them and the mechanisms of pain for the separation from them that were developed through evolution would be misplaced. By contrast, in their view, we inhabit a Heraclitean or Buddhist world of processes: indeed, by inhibiting our time circuits, mindful meditation releases us from perceiving reality as a world of objects and thereby reliefs us from pain. Fabbro and Crescentini remark on a limitation of attempts to employ mindful meditation as a pain killer in clinical contexts: a long time of meditation practice is needed for a subject to be able to alleviate pain through that method.