On-Chip Thermal Profiling to Detect Malicious Activity: System-Level Concepts and Design of Key Building Blocks

摘要

This article introduces an on-chip anomaly monitoring system design approach that is based on thermal profiling and side-channel analysis. The strategy aims at the realization of nonintrusive hardware Trojan (HT) detection over the lifetime of the circuit under test (CUT). To evaluate the capability of the proposed HT detection system, the on-chip electrothermal coupling is modeled as part of the simulation technique, which associates local thermal activities with circuit-level power consumption using a standard electrical simulator. To monitor the thermal profiles on chips with high sensitivity to local temperature changes and the resilience to flicker noise, the sensor architecture described in this article is the first differential temperature sensor equipped with a chopping mechanism. A methodology is described to utilize principal component analysis (PCA) to extract critical information from the quantized output of the system for effective HT detection in the presence of noise. The complete sensor signal path of the system was designed and simulated with foundry-supplied device models (130-nm CMOS technology), and the impact due to process variations have been considered via Monte Carlo simulations. The results indicate that small Trojans with approximately 2 mu W of power can be detected within the thermal profile of a CUT consuming more than 500 mu W. As the first step to prove the feasibility of on-chip quantization in the HT detection system, a prototype 8-bit successive approximation register (SAR) analog-to-digital converter (ADC) was fabricated with 130-nm CMOS technology.