首页> 外文期刊>Studia Logica >Truth Values, Neither-true-nor-false, and Supervaluations
【24h】

Truth Values, Neither-true-nor-false, and Supervaluations

机译:真值,非对非虚假和超值

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

The first section (§1) of this essay defends reliance on truth values against those who, on nominalistic grounds, would uniformly substitute a truth predicate. I rehearse some practical, Carnapian advantages of working with truth values in logic. In the second section (§2), after introducing the key idea of auxiliary parameters (§2.1), I look at several cases in which logics involve, as part of their semantics, an extra auxiliary parameter to which truth is relativized, a parameter that caters to special kinds of sentences. In many cases, this facility is said to produce truth values for sentences that on the face of it seem neither true nor false. Often enough, in this situation appeal is made to the method of supervaluations, which operate by “quantifying out” auxiliary parameters, and thereby produce something like a truth value. Logics of this kind exhibit striking differences. I first consider the role that Tarski gives to supervaluation in first order logic (§2.2), and then, after an interlude that asks whether neither-true-nor-false is itself a truth value (§2.3), I consider sentences with non-denoting terms (§2.4), vague sentences (§2.5), ambiguous sentences (§2.6), paradoxical sentences (§2.7), and future-tensed sentences in indeterministic tense logic (§2.8). I conclude my survey with a look at alethic modal logic considered as a cousin (§2.9), and finish with a few sentences of “advice to supervaluationists” (2.10), advice that is largely negative. The case for supervaluations as a road to truth is strong only when the auxiliary parameter that is “quantified out” is in fact irrelevant to the sentences of interest—as in Tarski’s definition of truth for classical logic. In all other cases, the best policy when reporting the results of supervaluation is to use only explicit phrases such as “settled true” or “determinately true,” never dropping the qualification. Keywords truth values - neither-true-nor-false - non-denoting terms - vagueness - paradoxes - future tense
机译:本文的第一节(§1)捍卫了对真理价值的依赖,反对那些以名义论为由统一取代真理谓词的人。我练习了在逻辑中使用真值的一些实际的,卡纳普式的优点。在第二部分(第2节)中,在介绍了辅助参数的主要概念(第2.1节)之后,我研究了几种情况,其中逻辑作为语义的一部分包含一个额外的辅助参数,该参数将真相相对于此,迎合特殊类型的句子。在许多情况下,据说这种功能会为句子产生真值,这些句子从表面上看都不是真假。通常,在这种情况下,人们会使用超级评估方法,该方法通过“量化”辅助参数进行操作,从而产生类似真值的结果。这种逻辑表现出惊人的差异。我首先考虑Tarski在一阶逻辑中对超值的作用(第2.2节),然后在询问是否“ true-nor-false本身都不是真值”(第2.3节)的插值之后,我考虑了具有非-用不确定性时态逻辑(§2.8)表示术语(第2.4节),模糊句子(第2.5节),歧义句子(第2.6节),自相矛盾的句子(第2.7节)和将来时的句子。在结束调查时,我首先考察了被视为表亲的道德模态逻辑(第2.9节),最后给出了几句话“对超值主义者的建议”(2.10),这些建议在很大程度上是负面的。只有当“量化”的辅助参数实际上与所关注的句子不相关时,才有理由将超值作为通向真理之路的理由很强,就像塔斯基(Tarski)对古典逻辑的真理的定义一样。在所有其他情况下,报告超评估结果时最好的策略是仅使用明确的短语,例如“已确定为正确”或“确定为正确”,切勿放弃资格。关键字真值-既非真非假-非指示性术语-模糊性-悖论-将来时

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号