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A secure, service priority-based incentive scheme for delay tolerant networks

机译:一种安全的,基于服务优先级的延迟容忍激励方案

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Delay tolerant networks are resource-constrained networks, where nodes are required to cooperate with each other to relay messages (bundles) in a store-carry-forward fashion. Because of the constrained resources, some selfish nodes are reluctant to relay bundles for other nodes in order to save their own resources. Previous studies focus on one kind of credit-based incentive schemes in which a source pays credits (virtual coins) to intermediates to compensate for their resources consumption. Although these schemes can restrain selfish behaviors to a certain extent, they may cause an undesirable effect on some honest nodes, especially on boundary nodes and inactive nodes. To mitigate this issue, first we propose a service priority-based incentive scheme (SIS) where a relaying (viewed as a service) priority, instead of credits, is used as an incentive metric to stimulate nodes to fairly cooperate. In the SIS, a node which relayed more bundles is granted a higher service priority, and it will obtain a higher bundle delivery ratio correspondingly. Then, to deal with the potential attacks against the SIS, we also present three security solutions including the signature chain, cooperation frequency statistics, and combination clearance. We evaluate the proposed scheme on the opportunistic network environment simulator. The extensive results show that the SIS is able to improve the bundle delivery ratio of honest nodes and efficiently inhibits the selfish behaviors in comparison with credit-based incentive schemes. Copyright (C) 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
机译:时延容忍网络是资源受限的网络,其中要求节点彼此协作以以存储转发方式中继消息(捆绑)。由于资源有限,一些自私的节点不愿为其他节点中继捆绑包,以节省其自身的资源。先前的研究集中于一种基于信用的激励计划,其中,来源向中间商支付信用(虚拟硬币)以补偿其资源消耗。尽管这些方案可以在一定程度上抑制自私行为,但是它们可能会对某些诚实节点(尤其是边界节点和非活动节点)产生不良影响。为了缓解此问题,首先我们提出了一种基于服务优先级的激励方案(SIS),其中将中继(视为服务)优先级(而不是信用)用作激励指标,以刺激节点公平合作。在SIS中,中继更多捆绑的节点被赋予较高的服务优先级,并且将相应地获得较高的捆绑交付率。然后,为了应对针对SIS的潜在攻击,我们还提出了三种安全解决方案,包括签名链,合作频率统计信息和组合许可。我们在机会网络环境模拟器上评估了提出的方案。广泛的结果表明,与基于信用的激励方案相比,SIS能够提高诚实节点的捆绑交付率,并有效地抑制自私行为。版权所有(C)2015 John Wiley&Sons,Ltd.

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