Evan Selinger and Robert P. Crease (eds.), The Philosophy of Expertise (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). XXpp. ISBN 0231136447, ￡$49.50 (hbk)

摘要

A book on the philosophy of expertise is overdue. This one collects fifteen previously published essays. It is hard to imagine a single academic reader who would encounter these in the course of normal subdisciplinary work: they represent a wide range of philosophical sub-specialties - epistemol-ogy, ethics, phenomenology, moral philosophy, and the philosophy of technology - but also law, varied approaches to the social study of science, and what one might best call humanistic social criticism. Some of the essays are lengthy and exacting - philosophy for philosophers; others are brief programmatic statements, and many lie somewhere between. All are accessible to a non-philosopher. Some are classics - Harry Collins' and Rob Evans' 2002 call for a third wave in science studies, Scott Brewer's careful examination of the grounds laypersons might have for accepting expert testimony in courts of law (1998), Stephen Turner's historical-philosophical delineation of the multiple kinds of expertise that citizens confront and their implications for democracy (2001). In other cases, the authors - e.g. Hubert Dreyfus, Paul Feyerabend, Steve Fuller, Peter Singer, Alvin Goldman, Don Ihde, and Edward Said - are well-known contributors to debates pertaining to aspects of expertise, though the selections presented do not adequately represent the richness of their positions (I cannot, however, suggest any alternatives of reasonable length).