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Both sides retaliate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

机译:双方在以巴冲突中进行报复

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摘要

Ending violent international conflicts requires understanding the causal factors that perpetuate them. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict Israelis and Palestinians each tend to see themselves as victims, engag-ing in violence only in response to attacks initiated by a fundamentally and implacably violent foe bent on their destruction. Econometric techniques allow us to empirically test the degree to which violence on each side occurs in response to aggression by the other side. Prior studies using these methods have argued that Israel reacts strongly to attacks by Palestinians, whereas Palestinian violence is random (i.e., not predicted by prior Israeli attacks). Here we replicate prior findings that Israeli killings of Palestinians increase after Palestinian killings of Israelis, but crucially show further that when nonlethal forms of vio-lence are considered, and when a larger dataset is used, Palestinian violence also reveals a pattern of retaliation: (ⅰ) the firing of Palestinian rockets increases sharply after Israelis kill Palestinians, and (ⅱ) the probability (although not the number) of killings of Israelis by Pales-tinians increases after killings of Palestinians by Israel. These findings suggest that Israeli military actions against Palestinians lead to escala-tion rather than incapacitation. Further, they refute the view that Pal-estinians are uncontingently violent showing instead that a signi-ficant proportion of Palestinian violence occurs in response to Israeli behavior. Well-established cognitive biases may lead participants on each side of the conflict to underappreciate the degree to which the other side's violence is retaliatory, and hence to systematically under-estimate their own role in perpetuating the conflict.
机译:结束暴力国际冲突需要了解使冲突长期存在的因果关系。在以巴冲突中,以色列人和巴勒斯坦人都倾向于将自己视为受害者,卷入暴力只是为了应对由一头根深蒂固的暴力仇敌所发起的袭击,而这种仇恨是针对他们的破坏。计量经济学的技术使我们能够凭经验检验每一方对另一方的侵略作出反应时发生暴力的程度。先前使用这些方法的研究认为,以色列对巴勒斯坦人的袭击反应强烈,而巴勒斯坦人的暴力行为是随机的(即以色列先前的袭击并未预测)。在这里,我们重复先前的发现,即在以色列杀害以色列人之后,以色列对巴勒斯坦人的杀戮有所增加,但至关重要的是进一步表明,当考虑非致命形式的暴力并使用更大的数据集时,巴勒斯坦暴力也显示出报复的模式:( ⅰ)在以色列人杀害巴勒斯坦人后,巴勒斯坦火箭的发射急剧增加;(ⅱ)在以色列人杀害巴勒斯坦人之后,帕雷斯-蒂尼族人杀害以色列人的可能性(尽管不是数量)增加。这些发现表明,以色列对巴勒斯坦人的军事行动导致升级,而不是丧失能力。此外,他们驳斥了巴勒斯坦人无休止地暴力的观点,而是表明很大一部分巴勒斯坦暴力事件是对以色列行为的回应。公认的认知偏见可能会导致冲突双方的参与者对对方的暴力报复程度有所低估,从而有系统地低估了他们在使冲突永久化中的作用。

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    Institute for Empirical Economics, University of Zurich, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland;

    rnDepartment of Philosophy, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv,Tel Aviv 69978, Israel Quinnipiac University, Hamden, CT 06518;

    rnMcGovern Institute for Brain Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,Cambridge. MA 02139;

  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);美国《生物学医学文摘》(MEDLINE);美国《化学文摘》(CA);
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