Optimal bidding strategies and modeling of imperfect informationamong competitive generators

摘要

The emerging electricity market behaves more like an oligopolynthan a perfectly competitive market due to special features such as, anlimited number of producers, large investment size (barrier to entry),ntransmission constraints, and transmission losses which discouragenpurchase from distant suppliers. This makes it practicable for only anfew independent power suppliers to service a given geographic region andnin this imperfect market each power supplier can increase its own profitnthrough strategic bidding. The profit of each supplier is influenced tonvarying extents by differences in the degree of imperfection ofnknowledge of rival suppliers. A new framework to build biddingnstrategies for power suppliers in an electricity market is presented innthis paper. It is assumed that each supplier bids a linear supplynfunction, and that the system is dispatched to minimize customernpayments. Each supplier chooses the coefficients in the linear supplynfunction to maximize benefits, subject to expectations about how rivalnsuppliers will bid. A stochastic optimization formulation is developednand two methods proposed for describing and solving this problem. Annumerical example serves to illustrate the essential features of thenapproach and the results are used to investigate the potential marketnpower