A Reply to David Bloor: 'Toward a Sociology of Epistemic Things'

摘要

First of all, I would like to thank David Bloor for his very thoughtful reflections on the notion of "epistemic things." He has surely pointed toward certain difficulties and even impasses that I have tried to do my best to circumvent in my book, but for which I was certainly not able to provide an ultimate solution. Let me then respond with a few remarks 1) on what it means to be an epistemic object; 2) on the problem of reference; 3) on the social constitution of the objects of science; and 4) on technoscience and the problem of demarcation. David contends that Toward a History of Epistemic Things faces, in his words, "a general problem about the nature of scientific discourse, namely the problem of reference." Reference, according to him, "is, or involves, aboutness." His main critique addresses what he, in contrast, calls my "non-referentiality thesis." Before I tackle this point, I think I should say a few words on the notion of "epistemic object." The general thrust of my whole argument is about the power of material objects—in contrast to ideas or concepts—as driving forces in the process of knowledge acquisition. Consequently, I am somewhat surprised to find my work categorized, in David's critique, under the label of "linguistic idealism." My goal was to provide an object-centered, materially founded account of knowledge production. According to my position, scientific or epistemic objects are clearly material things. They function as scientific or epistemic objects by virtue of their opacity, their surplus, their material transcendence, if you like, which is what arouses interest in them and keeps them alive as targets of research. The fact that referentiality is not what characterizes their essence does not, by any means, as I see it, catapult them into the realm of the ideal.