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Distributed Smart-Home Decision-Making in a Hierarchical Interactive Smart Grid Architecture

机译:分层交互式智能电网架构中的分布式智能家居决策

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In this paper, we develop a comprehensive real-time interactive framework for the utility and customers in a smart grid while ensuring grid-stability and quality-of-service (QoS). First, we propose a hierarchical architecture for the utility-customer interaction consisting of sub-components of customer load prediction, renewable generation integration, power-load balancing and demand response (DR). Within this hierarchical architecture, we focus on the problem of real-time scheduling in an abstract grid model consisting of one controller and multiple customer units. A scalable solution to the real-time scheduling problem is proposed by combining solutions to two sub-problems: () centralized sequential decision making at the controller to maximize an accumulated reward for the whole micro-grid and () distributed auctioning among all customers based on the optimal load profile obtained by solving the first problem to coordinate their interactions. We formulate the centralized sequential decision making at the controller as a hidden mode Markov decision process (HM-MDP). Next, a Vikrey auctioning game is designed to coordinate the actions of the individual smart-homes to actually achieve the optimal solution derived by the controller under realistic gird interaction assumptions. We show that though truthful bidding is a weakly dominant strategy for all smart-homes in the auctioning game, collusive equilibria do exist and can jeopardize the effectiveness and efficiency of the trading opportunity allocation. Analysis on the structure of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium solution set shows that the Vickrey auctioning game can be made more robust against collusion by customers (anticipating distributed smart-home- ) by introducing a positive reserve price. The corresponding auctioning game is then shown to converge to the unique incentive compatible truthful bidding Bayesian Nash equilibrium, without jeopardizing the auctioneer’s (microgrid controller’s) profit. The paper also explicitly discusses how this two-step solution approach can be scaled to be suitable for more complicated smart grid architectures beyond the assumed abstract model.
机译:在本文中,我们为智能电网中的公用事业和客户开发了一个全面的实时交互式框架,同时确保了电网的稳定性和服务质量(QoS)。首先,我们为公用事业与客户之间的互动提出了一种层次结构,该层次结构包括客户负荷预测,可再生能源发电集成,电力负荷平衡和需求响应(DR)的子组件。在这种分层体系结构中,我们专注于由一个控制器和多个客户单元组成的抽象网格模型中的实时调度问题。通过将解决方案与两个子问题相结合,提出了一种实时调度问题的可扩展解决方案:()在控制器处进行集中式顺序决策,以最大化整个微电网的累积奖励;以及()基于所有客户的分布式拍卖通过解决第一个问题来协调它们的相互作用而获得的最佳负载曲线。我们将集中式顺序决策制定为隐式马尔可夫决策过程(HM-MDP)。接下来,设计了一个Vikrey拍卖游戏,以协调各个智能家居的动作,从而在现实的网格互动假设下实际实现由控制器得出的最佳解决方案。我们证明,尽管真实竞标是拍卖游戏中所有智能家居的弱势策略,但确实存在共谋均衡,并且会损害交易机会分配的有效性和效率。对贝叶斯纳什均衡解决方案集的结构分析表明,通过引入正底价,可以使Vickrey拍卖游戏对客户的串通(预期分布式智能家居)更具鲁棒性。然后显示了相应的拍卖游戏,可以收敛到独特的激励兼容的真实竞标贝叶斯纳什均衡,而不会损害拍卖者(微电网控制器)的利润。本文还明确讨论了如何扩展此两步解决方案方法,使其适合于假定的抽象模型以外的更复杂的智能电网架构。

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