An iterative and fair protocol for bilateral multi-issue negotiation with complex utility space

摘要

Throughout the study of bilateral negotiation, researchers have strived to reach an agreement in a simplified scenario: with definite utility functions (linear or polynomial) or over independent issues, which in realistic is not that simple. To remove this limitation, in this paper, we illustrate a complex nonlinear utility space: bilateral negotiations over many issues with interdependent valuations. An iterative and fair protocol is proposed to explore it, seeking for a 'win-win' and 'envy-free' contract to both agents. It works by introducing a utility secret transportation mechanism, combined with the heuristic algorithm NSGA-II, to find the Pareto efficient outcomes without the exposure of negotiators' utility preferences. Experimental results analyze the benefit of employing Nash Product in the proposed protocol, and demonstrate its strengths in optimality rate and negotiating efficiency.