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首页> 外文期刊>IEEE transactions on mobile computing >ARC: an integrated admission and rate control framework for competitive wireless CDMA data networks using noncooperative games
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ARC: an integrated admission and rate control framework for competitive wireless CDMA data networks using noncooperative games

机译:ARC:使用非合作游戏的竞争性无线CDMA数据网络的集成准入和速率控制框架

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The competition among wireless data service providers brings in an option for the unsatisfied customers to switch their providers, which is called churning. The implementation of Wireless Local Number Portability (WLNP) is expected to further increase the churn rate (the probability of users switching the provider). However, the existing resource management algorithms for wireless networks fail to fully capture the far-reaching impact of this unforeseen competitiveness. From this perspective, we first formulate noncooperative games between the service providers and the users. A user's decision to leave or join a provider is based on a finite set of strategies. A service provider can also construct its game strategy set so as to maximize their utility (revenue) considering the churn rate. Based on the game theoretic framework, we propose an integrated admission and rate control (ARC) framework for CDMA-based wireless data networks. The admission control is at the session (macro) level while the rate control is at the link layer packet (micro) level. Two admission control modes are considered - one-by-one mode and batch processing mode, in which multiple users are admitted at a time. We show that: 1) for the one-by-one mode, the Nash equilibrium using pure strategy can be established for both under-loaded and fully-loaded systems and 2) for batch processing mode, there is either an equilibrium in pure strategy or a dominant strategy exists for the service provider. Therefore, the providers have clearly defined admission criteria as outcome of the game. Users are categorized into multiple classes and offered differentiated services based on the price they pay and the service degradation they can tolerate. We show that the proposed ARC framework significantly increases the provider's revenue and also successfully offers differentiated QoS to the users.
机译:无线数据服务提供商之间的竞争为不满意的客户提供了一种切换其提供商的选择,这称为搅动。无线本地号码可移植性(WLNP)的实现有望进一步提高客户流失率(用户切换提供商的可能性)。但是,现有的无线网络资源管理算法无法完全捕捉到这种不可预见的竞争力的深远影响。从这个角度出发,我们首先制定服务提供商和用户之间的非合作游戏。用户决定离开或加入提供者是基于一组有限的策略。服务提供商还可以构建其游戏策略集,以便在考虑流失率的情况下最大化其效用(收入)。基于博弈论框架,我们为基于CDMA的无线数据网络提出了一个集成的许可和速率控制(ARC)框架。准入控制在会话(宏)级别,而速率控制在链路层数据包(微)级别。考虑了两种准入控制模式-一对一模式和批处理模式,其中一次允许多个用户进入。我们表明:1)对于一对一模式,可以针对欠载和满载系统建立使用纯策略的Nash平衡,以及2)对于批处理模式,纯策略中存在一个平衡或服务提供商存在主导策略。因此,提供者已经将入场标准明确定义为游戏的结果。根据用户支付的价格和他们可以忍受的服务降级,将用户分为多个类别并提供差异化​​的服务。我们表明,提出的ARC框架显着增加了提供商的收入,并且还成功地为用户提供了差异化的QoS。

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