Rise of the Gulf

摘要

It is unquestionable that the UAE's move to become the first Arab country to send an ambassador to NATO is an important step and a key development for the country as it is reflective of the role it has taken on as a developing nation. The UAE has said and done all the right things to prove that it wants a stronger partnership with NATO. In addition to the above, the UAE has also supported prominent NATO missions, for example, by contributing airpower to Operation "Unified Protector," and by participating in the ISAF Afghan security forces training programme. In turn, previous NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has on several occasions expressed his desire to strengthen ties with the UAE and other states in the Gulf Cooperation Council. It is clear what NATO wants from the UAE: Help combating terrorism, funding military operations, and protecting regional sea-lanes, energy supply routes, and cyber networks. It might be less clear, however, what the UAE wants from NATO. The strength of that relationship notwithstanding, the small but oil-rich Gulf state still wants other security partners to insulate itself from regional volatility. Abu Dhabi prefers not to rely on Washington exclusively, especially since it has had serious qualms about US Middle East policy since President Barack Obama assumed office in 2009. The Gulf Cooperation Council, a political and economic union of Arab states in the Gulf, cannot meet the UAE's security needs, at least for now, because it is plagued by political rivalry and mistrust, and its military capabilities, though significant on paper, are largely unintegrated. China and Russia would be poor partners as well: the former is too insular and the latter is too hard to trust. Enter NATO.