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Institutional investors and international investments in emerging economy firms: A behavioral risk perspective

机译:制度投资者和新兴经济企业的国际投资:行为风险观点

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While the extant literature has examined the influence of controlling and non-controlling principals on the internationalization decisions of emerging market firms, heterogeneity among non-controlling principals is largely ignored. The risk characteristics of different groups of owners, shaped by their institutional environments, could contribute to the differences in their preferences for firm internationalization. In this paper, we draw insights from institutional theory and behavioral risk perspective to examine the risk propensities and risk perceptions of various non-controlling principals, such as pressure-resistant (Ells and mutual funds) and pressure-sensitive (banks, insurance companies and lending institutions) institutional investors. Empirical results from a sample of 2364 unique Indian firms during the 2005-2014 time-period show that, after controlling for firm-level resources and capabilities identified in prior literature, the ownership share of different types of institutional investors is associated with firms' international investments differently. While pressure-sensitive institutional investors, such as banks and insurance companies, are not supportive of foreign investments by firms, pressure-resistant institutional investors, such as Ells and mutual funds, are supportive of this strategic decision. Furthermore, our results show that the family ownership in a firm (measured in terms of family shareholding) further lowers the preference of pressure sensitive institutional investors for internationalization, whereas family ownership positively moderates the pressure resistant investors towards internationalization.
机译:虽然现役文献已经探讨了控制和非控制校长对新兴市场公司的国际化决定的影响,但非控股原则之间的异质性主要被忽视。由其制度环境形状的不同业主的风险特征可能导致他们对公司国际化偏好的差异。在本文中,我们利用制度理论和行为风险视角的洞察,审查各种非控股原则的风险促进和风险看法,如耐迫害(ELLS和相互资金)和压力敏感(银行,保险公司和贷款机构)机构投资者。在2005 - 2014年期间2364个独特的印度公司样本的经验结果表明,在对先前文献中确定的坚固级资源和能力控制后,不同类型的机构投资者的所有权份额与公司的国际相关联投资方式不同。虽然银行和保险公司(如银行和保险公司)的压力敏感的机构投资者并非支持国外投资,但耐腐败的机构投资者,如ELL和相互资金,都支持这一战略决策。此外,我们的结果表明,公司的家庭所有权(在家庭股权方面衡量)进一步降低了压力敏感机构投资者进行国际化的偏好,而家庭所有权积极调节迫害投资者对国际化的耐压投资者。

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