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The 'heuristics and biases' bias in expert elicitation

机译:专家启发中的“启发式和偏见”偏见

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摘要

In the early 1970s Tversky and Kahneman published a series of papers on 'heuristics and biases' describing human inadequacies in assessing probabilities, culminating in a highly popular article in Science. This seminal research has been heavily cited in many fields, including statistics, as the definitive research on probability assessment. Curiously, although this work was debated at the time and more recent work has largely refuted many of the claims, this apparent heuristics and biases bias in elicitation research has gone unremarked. Over a decade of research into the frequency effect, the importance of framing, and cognitive models more generally, has been almost completely ignored by the statistical literature on expert elicitation. To remedy this situation, this review offers a guide to the psychological research on assessing probabilities, both old and new, and gives concrete guidelines for eliciting expert knowledge.
机译:1970年代初期,Tversky和Kahneman发表了一系列有关“启发式和偏见”的论文,描述了人类在评估概率方面的不足,最终在《科学》杂志上发表了一篇广受欢迎的文章。这项开创性的研究已在许多领域被广泛引用,包括统计学,作为概率评估的权威性研究。奇怪的是,尽管这项工作在当时进行了辩论,而最近的工作在很大程度上驳斥了许多主张,但这种明显的启发式方法和偏见在启发研究中并未引起人们的注意。在对频率效应,框架的重要性以及更普遍的认知模型进行的十多年研究中,有关专家启发的统计文献几乎完全忽略了这一点。为了纠正这种情况,本综述为评估新旧概率的心理学研究提供了指南,并提供了获取专家知识的具体指南。

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