首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Management in Engineering >Life-Cycle Contract Management Strategies in US Highway Public-Private Partnerships: Public Control or Concessionaire Empowerment?
【24h】

Life-Cycle Contract Management Strategies in US Highway Public-Private Partnerships: Public Control or Concessionaire Empowerment?

机译:美国公路公私合作伙伴关系中的生命周期合同管理策略:公共控制或特许权赋权?

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
获取外文期刊封面目录资料

摘要

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are multilateral transactions implemented over long-time horizons; hence, they are complex arrangements that face various forms of uncertainty. These characteristics have made them a subject of research in a variety of fields. The nature of the transaction has attracted scholars who have examined them in the context of agency theory, incomplete contracts theory, and transaction cost economics (TCE). The prevalence of life-cycle uncertainty in PPPs is at the root of many contractual issues, such as incentive allocation, high transaction costs, and opportunism, which are innate in long-term contracts. Thus, the uncertainty management function of PPP contracts, including actor governance, plays an integral role in resolving contractual issues. Yet, limited research has comprehensively examined these topics at the project level. This investigation remedies this gap by examining how 23 PPP contracts in the US highways sector were structured to explore the tension between public sector control and concessionaire empowerment over the project life cycle. The findings demonstrate that public agencies utilize various approaches to monitor and control concessionaire actions rather than empowering them in PPPs. This suggests that agency problems persist in PPP arrangements. However, this circumstance may be a consequence of the sociopolitical scrutiny of public agencies generally and PPPs specifically, so further investigation of this observation is warranted. Further, the extensive monitoring activities uncovered will likely increase costs for public agencies and challenge their existing competencies.
机译:公私伙伴关系(PPP)是在长期视野中实施的多边交易;因此,它们是面对各种形式的不确定性的复杂布置。这些特征使它们成为各种领域的研究主题。交易的性质吸引了在机构理论,不完整合同理论和交易成本经济(TCE)的背景下审查了他们的学者。 PPP中生命周期不确定性的普遍性是许多合同问题的根源,例如激励分配,高交易成本和机会主义,这是在长期合同中的先天性。因此,PPP合约(包括演员治理)的不确定性管理职能在解决合同问题方面发挥了不可或缺的作用。然而,有限的研究在项目层面全面地检查了这些主题。这项调查通过审查美国公路部门的23个PPP合同构成了探讨了公共部门控制与特许经营权赋予项目生命周期的权力之间的紧张关系来解决这一差距。这些调查结果表明,公共机构利用各种方法来监测和控制特许经营权,而不是在PPP中授权它们。这表明代理问题仍然存在于PPP安排。然而,这种情况可能是公共机构的社会政治审查通常和PPP的结果,因此有必要进一步调查这种观察。此外,未发现的广泛监测活动可能会增加公共机构的成本,并挑战其现有的能力。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号