首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Global Ethics >Dehumanising the dehumanisers: reversal in human rights discourse
【24h】

Dehumanising the dehumanisers: reversal in human rights discourse

机译:非人道化者的非人道化:人权话语的逆转

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
       

摘要

If the legitimacy of international humanitarian and human rights law lies, in part at least, in its capacity to confront dehumanising actions in the modern world, we may speak of the limits of this achievement. It is well known that people who commit genocide or crimes against humanity typically dehumanise those against whom their crimes are committed and that the humanitarian and human rights dimensions of international law were developed in response to the radicalisation of this phenomenon. The expanded scope of international criminal justice caught a cosmopolitan imagination because it seemed to restore an idea of humanity in the face of organised attempts to eradicate the very idea of universal humanity. It also caught a cosmopolitan imagination because it seemed to restore the humanity of the perpetrators as well. They were no longer to be treated as beasts liable to the ‘punishment’ of the victors but to be brought to trial, held accountable for their deeds and converted back into responsible human beings. Today, however, I suggest that we face a double temptation: in confronting those who commit crimes against humanity to represent them as inhuman monsters rather than responsible human beings; in our compassion for victims of crimes against humanity, it is to represent them merely as victims and not as moral and political subjects. In either case, there can arise a reversal of the problem we are trying to address. I do not suggest this tendency is inevitable but where it is present it indicates an insufficiently reflective relation to international law. I address the problem of reversal through a discussion of three authors (Rawls, Habermas and Arendt) and three issues (‘pariah peoples’, ‘criminal states’ and ‘monstrous perpetrators’).View full textDownload full textKeywordsArendt, Habermas, Rawls, dehumanisation, international law, human rights, reflexivity, crimes against humanityRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449626.2010.494364
机译:如果国际人道主义法和人权法的合法性至少部分地在于其对抗现代世界中非人道行动的能力,我们可以说这一成就的局限性。众所周知,犯下种族灭绝或危害人类罪的人通常会使犯有罪行的人不人道,国际法的人道主义和人权方面是针对这种现象的激化发展的。国际刑事司法范围的扩大引起了世界性的想象,因为面对有组织的企图消灭普遍性人类的思想,它似乎恢复了一种人类的思想。它也引起了世界性的想象,因为它似乎也恢复了犯罪者的人性。他们不再被视为对胜利者“处以惩罚”的野兽,而是要接受审判,对他们的行为负责,并转变为负责任的人类。但是,今天,我建议我们面临双重诱惑:面对那些犯下危害人类罪的人,将其表示为不人道的怪物而不是负责任的人;在我们对危害人类罪受害者的同情中,是将他们仅仅作为受害者而不是道德和政治主体。无论哪种情况,都可能会逆转我们试图解决的问题。我并不是说这种趋势是不可避免的,但是它存在的地方表明它与国际法之间的反思不足。我通过讨论三位作者(Rawls,Habermas和Arendt)和三个问题(“贱民”,“犯罪国家”和“恶作剧者”)来解决逆转问题。文本下载全文关键字阿伦特,哈贝马斯,罗尔斯,非人性化,国际法,人权,反身性,危害人类罪,stumbleupon,digg,google,more“,发布号:” ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b“};添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449626.2010.494364

著录项

  • 来源
    《Journal of Global Ethics》 |2010年第2期|p.179-190|共12页
  • 作者

    Robert Finea*;

  • 作者单位
  • 收录信息
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-18 01:01:35

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号