New insights into mutual fund brokerage commissions

摘要

Using data collected from equity mutual fund reports filed by single-fund registrants to the Securities and Exchange Commission, I study the determinants of brokerage commissions paid by fund managers when they buy or sell securities and investigate the role these commissions play in fund performance. Consistent with related studies, my results from cross-sectional analyses reveal that higher portfolio turnover funds are associated with higher commissions and larger funds incur lower commissions, as well as the positive relation between expense ratios and commissions. This positive relation is puzzling as most commissions include "soft dollars" for payments of products and services that should be already covered by the costs reported under expense ratios. However, once I take into account unobservable fund heterogeneity, I find that higher expense ratio funds do not necessarily pay higher commissions. Further, controlling for whether a fund increased commission payments as the result of flow-induced trading, I show that the underperformance related to brokerage commissions documented in the literature is attributable (at least partly) to higher level of fund flows.