CA-Based Detection of Coherence Exploiting Hardware Trojans

摘要

Nowadays, Hardware Trojan threats have become inevitable due to the growing complexities of Integrated Circuits (ICs) as well as the current trend of Intellectual Property (IP)-based hardware designs. An adversary can insert a Hardware Trojan during any of its life cycle phases - the design, fabrication or even at manufacturing phase. Once a Trojan is inserted into a system, it can cause an unwanted modification to system functionality which may degrade system performance or sometimes Trojans are implanted with the target to leak secret information. Once Trojans are implanted, they are hard to detect and impossible to remove from the system as they are already fabricated into the chip. In this paper, we propose three stealthy Trojan models which affect the coherence mechanism of Chip Multiprocessors' (CMPs) cache system by arbitrarily modifying the cache block state which in turn may leave the cache line states as incoherent. We have evaluated the payload of such modeled Trojans and proposed a cellular automaton (CA)-based solution for detection of such Trojans.