Lightweight Bytecode Verification

摘要

In this paper, we provide a theoretical foundation for and improvements to the existing bytecode verification technology, a critical component of the Java security model, for mobile code used with the Java "micro edition" (J2ME), which is intended for embedded computing devices. In Java, remotely loaded "bytecode" class files are required to be bytecode verified before execution, that is, to undergo a static type analysis that protects the platform's Java run-time system from so-called type confusion attacks such as pointer manipulation. The data flow analysis that performs the verification, however, is beyond the capacity of most embedded devices because of the memory requirements that the typical algorithm will need. We propose to take a proof-carrying code approach to data flow analysis in defining an alternative technique called "lightweight analysis" that uses the notion of a "certificate" to reanalyze a previously analyzed data flow problem, even on poorly resourced platforms. We formally prove that the technique provides the same guarantees as standard bytecode safety verification analysis, in particular that it is "tamper proof" in the sense that the guarantees provided by the analysis cannot be broken by crafting a "false" certificate or by altering the analyzed code. We show how the Java bytecode verifier fits into this framework for an important subset of the Java Virtual Machine; we also show how the resulting "lightweight bytecode verification" technique generalizes and simulates the J2ME verifier (to be expected as Sun's J2ME "K-Virtual machine" verifier was directly based on an early version of this work), as well as Leroy's "cm-card bytecode verifier," which is specifically targeted for Java Cards.