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Mutual-Fund-Affiliated Analysts and Stock Price Synchronicity: Evidence From China

机译:共同基金分析师与股票价格同步性:来自中国的证据

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We contend that mutual-fund-affiliated analysts have conflicts of interest in their role of information production. Similar to the investment-bank-affiliated analysts (Malmendier & Shanthikumar, 2014), mutual-fund-affiliated analysts are very likely to speak in two tongues, issuing optimism-biased recommendations to please their mutual fund clients due to the clients’ holdings of the stocks but less optimistic forecasts for their covered firms to provide firm-specific information for mutual funds. The net effect of these mutual-fund-affiliated analysts’ conflicting actions is not clear. We use a unique Chinese dataset that discloses the business affiliations between mutual funds and brokerage firms through commission allocations to examine whether mutual-fund-affiliated analysts produce more (or less) firm-specific information in their research compared with non-affiliated analysts. Our results indicate that mutual-fund-affiliated analysts produce more firm-specific information, manifested by lower stock price synchronicity for the firms they cover. We further find that the mutual-fund-affiliated analyst effects are more pronounced for stocks that represent significant exposure to an affiliated mutual fund’s investment, where mutual funds presumably need more firm-specific information to make investment decisions. Finally, we document that mutual-fund-affiliated analysts conduct more site visits on the stocks held by their mutual fund clients, which explains the greater information dissemination by mutual-fund-affiliated analysts.
机译:我们认为,共同基金下属的分析师在其信息生产中存在利益冲突。与投资银行附属分析师(Malmendier&Shanthikumar,2014)相似,共同基金附属分析师很可能会说两种话,并发布乐观偏见的建议,以取悦其共同基金客户,因为客户持有股票,但对其涵盖的公司提供共同基金的公司特定信息的乐观预测较少。这些共同基金分析师的冲突行动的净结果尚不清楚。我们使用一个独特的中文数据集,该数据集通过佣金分配公开了共同基金与经纪公司之间的业务联系,以检查与非联系分析师相比,与共同基金联系的分析师在研究中是否产生更多(或更少)的公司特定信息。我们的结果表明,与共同基金相关的分析师产生了更多的公司特定信息,这表现为他们所涵盖公司的股票价格同步性较低。我们还发现,对于代表着共同基金投资的大量敞口的股票,共同基金分析师的影响更为明显,因为共同基金可能需要更多公司特定信息来做出投资决策。最后,我们记录了共同基金分析师对他们的共同基金客户持有的股票进行了更多的实地考察,这解释了共同基金分析师在信息传播方面的优势。

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