TERRITORIAL INEQUALITIES BASED ON WILLINGNESS TO PAY IN THE JOINT PROVISION OF ROAD TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THEORETICAL MODELING AND PRACTICAL VALIDATION

摘要

This paper considers two public agents (the state and the regional authority) jointly implementing a road project. Our model is based on the use of economic agents in the Willingness to Pay (WTP) joint financing of such a road project. We show that there are cases where the joint implementation of a road project is a Pareto improvement to the satisfaction of both agents, yet their WTPs are not the same. The optimal supply of this public good is independent of the initial wealth of each agent. Empirically, state intervention in regional projects is not limited by its initial wealth, and its political decision is reflected in its WTP for each region. Thus, thanks to its varying WTP, the state creates regional inequalities. In the Tunisian case, regional inequalities in transport have long persisted. The results show that the WTP of the state varies over geographical regions, thus favoring some regions more than others. In essence, the coastal cities are favored the most, and as we move away from the capital Tunis, toward the south or west of the country, the inequalities become starker. The western regions on the Algerian border are the most neglected in terms of road infrastructure.